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LEGAL SANCTIONS TO ENFORCE DESEGREGATION IN
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE CONTEMPT POWER
AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
IMPLEMENTATION of desegregation in the public schools is a problem that
will be solved, at least in part, by resort to the coercive sanctions that the
law provides. The history of law enforcement in the United States does not
demonstrate that the full use of the more powerful legal weapons necessarily
results in obedience, or that it is even advisable to use all available legal force
to effect as widespread a social change as desegregation.' But the wisdom
of using legal sanctions cannot properly be assessed without knowledge and
analysis of what legal force can be mobilized. Since Southern senators can be
expected, by means of the filibuster, to prevent the enactment of new legis-
lation specifically designed to enforce desegregation, existing laws and court
powers must suffice. The contempt power of the federal courts 2 and the
Federal Civil Rights Acts 3 appear to afford sanctions which can be used to
help eliminate resistance to legally valid attempts to establish and maintain a
nondiscriminatory school system. This comment will examine the extent to
which these two devices can be so utilized.
THE RIGHT TO DESEGREGATED EDUCATION
Racial segregation in the public school systems of the forty-eight states and
the District of Columbia is now unconstitutional even if Negro and white
school children are afforded physical equality in educational facilities. In
Brown v. Board of Education 4 the Supreme Court held that segregation in
1. See Comment, Racial Violence and Civil Rights Law Enforcement, a U. Cm. L.
REv. 769 (1951).
2. Early in United States legal history the Supreme Court stated that the federal
courts have an inherent and indispensable power to use fines and imprisonment to coerce
obedience and to punish for defiance of their orders. E.g., United States v. Hudson,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). See also Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505,
510 (1873). This power has been limited by Congress in a number of enactments, but
the basic power, especially the power to coerce rather than to punish, has remained as it
was in 1812. The most important statutory limitation is 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1952), which
allows a federal court to punish for contempt of its authority only when conduct tits into
three specified categories, one of which is "disobedience to its lawful writ, process, ordkr,
rule, decree or command," 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1952). Whether or not § 401 is ap-
plicable to the court's power over civil contempt is uncertain. See Wright, et al., Civil
and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 169 (1955).
3. 16 STAT. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1952) ; 14 STAT. 27 (1866), 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1952) ; 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952) ; 18 STAT. 337 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1984 (1952) ; 12 STAT. 284 (1861), 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1952) ; 17 STAT.
15 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1952) (civil provisions) ; 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-42 (1952)
(criminal provisions).
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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state schools deprives Negro children of their Fourteenth Amendment right to
the equal protection of the laws. In a companion case, Bowling v. Sharpe,5
segregation in the capital's public schools was held to infringe the due process
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. The Court did not promulgate its decree
until over a year after it decided that school segregation was unconstitutional,
during which time it allowed reargument on the proper formulation of its
mandate.0 The decree remanded the four cases which had been consolidated
in Brown to the district courts in which they originated, with instructions that
the district courts require defendant boards of education forthwith to make a
prompt and reasonable start towards admitting plaintiffs to the public schools
on a nondiscriminatory basis.7 If defendants establish that they are making a
bonafide attempt to desegregate, the courts are authorized to allow additional
time where they find that some delay is justified. The Supreme Court apparent-
ly intended to limit the discretion of the district courts, for it listed the factors
which the lower courts could take into consideration in deciding on requested
extensions. They consist of both problems of administration such as the physical
condition of the plant, the school transportation system, and necessary revision
of local laws and regulations, and the adequacy of any plans proposed by de-
fendants.8
The Nature of the Right
The nature of a student's right to desegregated education is not clear. The
only certain aspect of the right is that its deprivation may be remedied by
equitable relief in the manner prescribed by the Brown decree. Thus, all
Negro children in the South have both the right to require a district court to
5. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
6. The Supreme Court decree for both the state and District of Columbia cases is
found in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). The state cases came from
separate school districts in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia and Delaware.
7. Ibid. See Jackson v. Rawdon, 135 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Tex. 1955) (commencement
by school district of work on plans for integration held to constitute a prompt and reason-
able start).
8. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). See note 20 infra for relevant
excerpts from the decree.
Lower court responses to the Brown decision and decree have taken four forms: (1)
Designating a date for final integration, Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ky.
1955) ; (2) Adopting a plan for gradual integration submitted by the school board, Brown
v. Board of Education, Civil No. T-316, D. Kan., Oct. 28, 1955; (3) Issuing a decree order-
ing integration after time for "necessary" arrangements has elapsed, Briggs v. Elliott, 132
F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955), Davis v. County School Bd., Civil No. 1333, E.D. Va., July
18, 1955; (4) Ordering only a start towards integration, and deferring consideration of
further orders until the school board has had time to solve local problems, Matthews v.
Launius, 134 F. Supp. (W.D. Ark. 1955); cf. Jackson v. Rawdon, 135 F. Supp. 936 (N.D.
Tex. 1955).
The decrees in Briggs and Davis ordered: "[T]hat the defendants be and they are
hereby restrained and enjoined from refusing on account of race (or color) to admit to
any school under their supervision any child qualified to enter such school, from and after
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order their local school boards to make a prompt and reasonable start towards
integration and the right to have the court's discretion in allowing delay limited
in the manner stipulated by the Brown decree. But defining the right to in-
tegrated education will prove difficult whenever plaintiffs seek to remedy
deprivations of this right in an action at law. The civil provisions of the Civil
Rights Acts entitle a plaintiff to money damages for a deprivation of his Four-
teenth Amendment rights. 9
There are three possible interpretations of the "right" which the Brown
decision recognizes. First, an immediate right to attend an integrated school
may have been established. Under this view a Negro child denied access to
an integrated school could immediately sue for damages even though the grant-
ing of equitable relief ordering his admission could be postponed in the manner
outlined in the Brown decree. Secondly, the immediate right recognized by
the Brown decision may be only the right to have a local school board make a
prompt and reasonable start towards integration; the right to enter an in-
tegrated school would mature only when there had elapsed sufficient time
for the elimination of the factors which the Brown decree indicated might
justify postponing complete desegregation. This theory would require a plain-
tiff seeking damages to prove that the school board's delay was not justified. 10
Finally, it could be contended that by investing the district courts with quasi-
administrative authority over the implementation of desegregation, the Supreme
Court recognized an immediate right only to set the district court machinery
in motion on the course delimited by the Brown decree. Whenever a district
court orders a school board to take specific steps towards integration, a Negro
child would acquire a right to the benefit of what has been ordered.' Under
this view the right to attend an integrated school would not mature until the
date actually set by a district court for complete desegregation.
Of these three possible interpretations, the view recognizing an immediate
right to an integrated education is the most consistent with traditional pre-
cepts of constitutional law, but this interpretation runs counter to the spirit of
the Court's approach to the problem and is thoroughly unrealistic. Generally,
when the Supreme Court holds some state action to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, all persons have an immediate right to invoke the Civil Rights
Acts and sue for damages for deprivations caused by any continued unconsti-
such time as they (the defendants) may have made the necessary arrangements for admis-
sion of children to such school on a non-discriminatory basis with all deliberate speed as
required by the decision of the Supreme Court in this cause." Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, supra; Davis v. County School Bd., supra (words in parentheses are used only in
Davis).
9. See text at notes 111-53 infra.
10. In these damage suits the plaintiff can also request a decree ordering complete
integration. Though the legal right may have matured, equity will still not order integra-
tion until the permissable time period, measured from the date of a decree, has elapsed.
11. This same result should also follow under the second interpretation, whenever
the plaintiff elects to obtain a decree.
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tutional action.12 But it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court had any in-
tention of subjecting school boards to suits for damages before they had a rea-
sonable time to eliminate a system of segregated schools. 13 Even if this view
were to prevail, Negro plaintiffs would be well-advised to refrain from exploit-
ing it. If courts were confronted with suits for damages before school boards
had time to integrate, judicial reluctance to uphold such damage claims might
well prompt interpretations of the Civil Rights Acts which would drastically
restrict the utility of these statutes in more reasonable situations.
14
As between the two interpretations recognizing that the right to attend an
integrated school may not be immediate, the view that the right will mature
after a certain period of time has elapsed, irrespective of whether a decree is
obtained, seems preferable. Both interpretations agree that the right to an in-
tegrated education is unique among Fourteenth Amendment rights in that it
was not mature on the day it was recognized. This departure from traditional
constitutional interpretation may be justified by the complexities which the
Court has recognized will attend the process of desegregating the entire school
system of any particular district. Though earlier education decisions declared
that the right of a Negro to attend a white graduate school was immediate,
these decisions were concerned with the right to attend a school that was al-
ready in operation.'" The establishment of a new system of schools was not
required. But the notion that the delayed right matures only after a district
court decree orders complete integration seems unnecessarily restrictive. Nor-
mally, vindication of rights does not depend on the securing of a decree order-
ing the recognition of those rights. Such an interpretation should not be
adopted in the absence of a clear mandate in the Brown decision.
In practice the theoretical differences between these two positions will gen-
erally prove to be of little consequence. Under the theory of a right indepen-
dent of a decree, the plaintiff may sue for damages where the school board
violates the immediate right to a prompt and reasonable start made towards
integration. But school boards will usually be able to defeat these suits by
demonstrating that the appointment of committees to "study" the problem
constitutes a "start."' A real difference might sometimes develop, however,
when a plaintiff sues for denial of his delayed right to attend an integrated
school. Very likely district courts faced with such damage suits would often
find that a sufficient time period had not elapsed and hence deny that the right
had matured. But if a considerable period of time has elapsed, it will be almost
12. E.g., McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955); Flemming v. South
Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955).
13. See text at note 15 infra.
14. For a discussion of the doctrines which courts may use to restrict the application
of the Civil Rights Acts, see text at notes 135-53 infra.
15. "It is fundamental that these cases concern rights which are personal and present."
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637 (1950) ; see State ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 24 U.S.L. WEEK
4135 (U.S. March 12, 1956).
16. Jackson v. Rawdon, 135 F. Supp. 936 (N.D. Tex. 1955).
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impossible for district courts to find that the factors specified in the Brown
decree could justify such a delay.17 Nevertheless, Negro students who want to
attend an integrated school will probably achieve that result primarily by seek-
ing decrees ordering integration. Most of the damage suits brought in the
near future for denial of the right to attend an integrated school will probably
fail, since courts will be reluctant to say that the requisite time period has
elapsed when this determination would result in the imposition of damages. In
denying damages, these courts will probably grant additional time to integrate;
so the result will often be substantially the same as if the plaintiffs had been
content to seek only equitable relief in the first instance.
In Northern communities which for many years have maintained integrated
school systems and in Southern communities which voluntarily convert to such
systems, a student's right to an integrated education should be immediate under
any theory. Brown recognizes a delayed right to attend an integrated school
only in districts where certain factors justify delay in changing from a segre-
gated to a desegregated system. But in districts where changes in the school
system are unnecessary or where school boards concede that no factors justify
delay, there is no need for gradualism. In such a school district impairment
of the right to an integrated education might take the form of discriminatory
practices by individual school officials, attempts by private persons to interfere
with an integrated system, or an attempt by the governing political unit to
disestablish the integrated system. As soon as these deprivations are sustained
or threatened, they can be remedied by the Civil Rights Acts.'-
17. The possibility that sufficiently long delay would warrant the imposition of damages
against defendant school boards, even though no decree had informed the boards what
time period was permissible, might lead to an anomalous result. School boards, not
knowing at what point in time they might become liable for damages to all Negro
school children in their districts, might find it advisable to seek declaratory judgments
to determine what period of time the local district court will allow. See 28 U.S.C. §
2202 (1952), Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 216, 244 (1937). In such suits
the courts might not only determine the time period but also issue a decree ordering inte-
gration within the period. Cf. Petersine Incubator Co. v. Bundy Incubator Co., 135 F.2d
580 (6th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 320 U.S. 805 (1943) (in suit for a declaratory judgment
invalidating a patent, court declared patent valid, enjoined plaintiff from further infringe-
ment, and ordered an accounting). Thus, the numerous lawsuits which it is now anticipated
will be brought by Negro students to obtain decrees, see text at notes 31-33 infra, may
in some areas be brought by school boards.
18. See note 3 supra; text at notes 92-156 infra.
Judicial consideration of the nature of a student's right to a desegregated education
has thus far been confined to the problem of equitable relief. For example, the Delaware
Supreme Court, writing during the period between the Brown decision and decree, ob-
served: "The effect of the decision in the Segregation Cases seems to us to be this: The Su-
preme Court of the United States has determined a right to exist, but has not yet deter-
mined the remedy. Until that remedy shall be fixed, the right is not a present enforceable
one." Steiner v. Simmons, 111 A.2d 574, 579 (Del. 1955). It should be noted that "thc
remedy" requested in Brown was equitable relief. Therefore, the conclusion that "the
right" is not a "present enforceable one" does not necessarily follow where plaintiffs seek
damages under the analysis outlined above.
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Desegregation Is To Take Effect in the Face of Southern Resistance
The opinion and decree in Brown demonstrate that the Court did not intend
to let the South proceed towards desegregation at its own speed. Thus coercive
sanctions generally available for remedying deprivations of constitutional rights
and enforcing decrees which restrain the deprivation of those rights may be
used, if necessary. Although in argument the Court did consider the possi-
bility that an attempt to desegregate the schools would encounter extreme re-
sistance,1 the wording of its decree indicates that the Court will not tolerate
the postponement of school integration until Southern opinion is ready for the
change.2 0 Desegregation is to be effected even in the face of Southern resist-
ance. The only suggestion that the district courts may consider public resist-
ance, in proceedings for additional time to complete integration, is the state-
19. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument, Briggs v. Elliot, Oct. Term, 1953,
pp. 77-79, decided sub norm. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 349 U.S.
294 (1955). See Note, 64 YALE L.J. 124, 133-34 (1954), for analysis of the propriety of
giving weight to such considerations.
20. The importance of this question justifies a fairly full reprint of the court's decree:
"These cases were decided on May 17, 1954. The opinions of that date, declaring
the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconsti-
tutional, are incorporated herein by reference. All provisions of federal, state or
local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle.
"Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of
varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility
for . . . solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the action
of the school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of governing con-
stitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the possible
need for further hearings, the courts which originally heard these cases can best
perform this judicial appraisal. Accordingly we believe it appropriate to remand
the cases to those courts.
"In fashioning and effectuating the decrees the courts will be guided by equitable
principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility
in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and
private needs. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to
public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate
this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the
transition.... Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest
in the elimination of a variety of such obstacles in a systematic and effective
manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional
principles can not be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them.
"While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will
require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full com-
pliance with our May 17, 1954 ruling. Once such a start has been made, the
courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an
effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such
time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance
at the earliest possible date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related
to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school
transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas
into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public
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ment that courts of equity may take into account the public interest in the
systematic and effective elimination of the "variety of obstacles" to the tran-
sition.2 1 The possible implication that public resistance is one of such "ob-
stacles" seems to be negatived by the Court's specific enumeration of the factors
which the district courts may consider in determining whether to allow delay.
Public resistance was not mentioned.
22
Nevertheless, implementation of the principles promulgated in Brown and
Bowling may be greatly delayed, for a substantial amount of resistance-direct
and indirect, spontaneous and planned-is to be expected whenever there is
an attempt to order integration.23 In communities which began desegregation
before the promulgation of the decree, opposition has already arisen. The Mil-
ford incident in Delaware is a graphic example of intimidation by community
action which can force a school board to abandon its attempt to admit Negroes
into white schools.2 4 In many of the states which are awaiting specific decrees,
legislators, public officials and community leaders have been formulating elabo-
rate plans for evading the expected attempt to enforce desegregation. 2 At no
other time since the enactment of the post-Civil War amendments has the
South had to face such an enormous social change imposed under national law.
At no other time since the early days of the Ku Klux Klan has the Southern
white community been mobilized in as comprehensive a program to deny
Negroes their constitutional rights.
schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may
be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will, also consider the ade-
quacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and effectuate
a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system."
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 298-301 (1955).
21. Id. at 300.
22. Id. at 300-01. That the enumeration of specific factors comes after the statement
of a "variety of obstacles," further suggests that the enumeration qualifies the broad
phrase used by the Court. This interpretation of Brown is consistent with the construction
given the decree in Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ky. 1955). The court
ordered school officials to integrate Adair County elementary schools completely by
September 1956, and to integrate the Adair County high school by February 1956. Only
administrative difficulties were considered by the court in setting the time limits.
23. In the states which have taken positive steps towards integration, little violence
has taken place although organized resistance and loud protest is abundant in many areas.
However, school districts with a substantial percentage of Negro students have made
little attempt to integrate.
The most comprehensive and accurate report of general and legal news concerning
desegregation can be found in the monthly publications of Southern School News, published
by the Southern Education Reporting Service, P.O. Box 6156, Acklen Station, Nashville,
Tennessee. And see 1 RAcE RELATIONS L. REP. passim (1956).
24. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1954, § 1, p. 21, col. 1. See also id., May 16, 1955, § 1,
p. 18, col. 2, for a report of the election in the Milford school district of a board of
education pledged to continue segregation.
25. U.S. News & World Report, May 28, 1954, pp. 21-24; N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1955,
p. 24 cols. 2-4 (report of speech of Eugene Cook, Attorney General of Georgia). Set
Southern School News, supra note 23, for current reports of plans for circumvention.
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Southern resistance will undoubtedly assume diverse forms.20 While resist-
ance may initially take place in the refusal of certain district court judges to
follow the letter or spirit of the directions in a Brown-type decree, most of the
resistance will probably arise in opposition to the district court decrees formu-
lated in accordance with the Supreme Court's orders.
2 7
Modes of resistance will include refusal to comply with district court orders;
violence and threats of violence directed by white students, their parents and
other adults, with and without the aid or acquiescence of school and govern-
mental officials, against Negro students, their parents and leaders as well as
against boards of education, public officials and white persons who accept and
attempt to implement desegregation; strikes by school children and teachers;
economic coercion-the use by employers, creditors and banks of their power
to control the economic security of others to coerce Negroes and other persons
into accepting segregation ;28 segregation within a nominally interracial school;
and legislative circumvention such as gerrymandering, abolition of public
schools and public financing of private segregated schools, withdrawal of state
financial support to schools which do desegregate, authorization of individual
assignments of students to particular schools in accordance with the discretion
of the school board or with ostensibly nonracial classifications which in fact
permit assignments on the basis of race, and institution of a complicated system
26. Recent legal literature is already replete with discussion of some forms of resistance
and with predictions of a "generation of lawsuits." See, e.g., Leflar & Davis, Segregation
in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARv. L. REv. 377 (1954) ; Nicholson, The Legal Standing
of the South's School Resistance Proposals, 7 S.C.L.Q. 1 (1954); Winter, Mississippi's
Legislative Approach to the School Segregation Problem, 26 Miss. L.J. 165 (1955) ; Roche,
Plessy v. Ferguson: Requiescat in Pace? 103 U. PA. L. REv. 44 (1954) ; Sutherland,
Segregation by Race in Public Schools-Retrospect and Prospect, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 169 (1955).
27. For an illustration of resistance to integration voluntarily instituted by a local school
board, see Hoxie School District No. 46 v. Brewer, 135 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1955),
temporary injunction made permanent, 24 U.S.L. WEEi 2323 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 9, 1956).
After the Brown decree, on its own volition, Hoxie School District No. 46 in Arkansas
ordered its schools to open in July 1955 on an integrated basis. Pupils and their parents
peacefully complied for about three weeks when defendants, including members of an
association called White America, Inc., started a campaign of opposition to the school board
action, which culminated in a mass meeting marked by incendiary speeches and threats
of violence. The school board, alleging that the intimidation had caused attendance to
decline and that they were thus forced to suspend school sessions, obtained a district court
injunction prohibiting certain named defendants, their agents, and those in active concert,
from attempting to trespass or picket on property of the school district, from interfering
with the lawful administration of the school district or from intimidating, threatening or
attempting to harm plaintiffs or cause them to violate the United States Constitution and
laws of the United States in regard to their official duties. Since the school board rather
than a student sued for an injunction, the district court's holding that it had jurisdiction
is questionable; but even if it erred in this respect, the same result may be obtained as
long as a suit is initially brought on behalf of an aggrieved student. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1952).
28. See U.S. News & World Report, Oct. 29, 1954, pp. 29-30.
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of administrative review of pupil assignments which is designed to delay re-
dress of discrimination.29
It is commonly believed that the South will gain enormous delays by inaugu-
rating evasive programs. But such delays are not inevitable. When, in the face
of a desegregation decree, defendant school board members participate in some
type of evasive action which the court invalidates, plaintiffs can later argue
that any right to additional time to complete integration has been forfeited.
Brown stated that the district courts would be sitting as courts of equity in
determining whether to extend the period for compliance. One who has at-
tempted to evade a court's mandate cannot come into that very court whose
mandate he has violated and ask for equitable relief. He should be barred by
the well-established doctrine that equity will not aid a party with unclean
hands.30
An unavoidable delay in achieving integration in all schools results from the
need to institute separate law suits against each school board which refuses to
integrate, since district court decrees ordering desegregation bind only defen-
dants in a particular suit.31 If the district courts fail to issue such decrees,
plaintiffs can obtain them by appeal to the courts of appeals, or if necessary
the Supreme Court. Once Negro plaintiffs can show racial separation in a
school system, district and appellate courts will find it difficult to refuse to
promulgate Brown-type decrees. 32 And as in Brown, suits from a number of
district courts can be consolidated if an appellate court permits.33
THE CONTEMPT POWER
The broad contempt powers of the federal courts will be available to reach
many of the more serious and tenacious forms of interference. In the centers
of greatest resistance federal court decrees will probably be necessary in order
to start integration. Once such decrees are obtained, the contempt power can
be invoked to combat disobedience and defiance.
34
29. A summary of the legislation designed to circumvent federally imposed integration,
which has been enacted in the eight states of the deep South, is found in Southern School
News, Feb. 1956, p. 2.
30. See MCCLINTOcK, EQuiTy § 26 (1948).
31. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 407 (1925). In Brown the defendants in the consolidated
suits were school board members of individual school districts in Kansas, South Carolina,
Delaware, Virginia and the District of Columbia. Other school boards are not in privity with
these defendants. But since these were class actions, Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 495 (1954), defendant school boards in their respective school districts must
give the benefits of the district court decree to all school children who are similarly situated
to the named plaintiffs. See, e.g., Bryce v. Byrd, 201 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Holmes v.
City of Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954).
32. See note 20 supra.
33. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; see, e.g., Sup. CT. RULE 43(5).
If a number of such actions are instituted in the same judicial district, the district court
may order a consolidation to determine common questions of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1952). See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S.
187, 193 (1949) ; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-05 (1947)
Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U.S. 107 (1922).
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The two types of contempt proceedings-civil and criminal-have different
substantive and procedural rules which will determine their utility.35 When the
proceeding is solely to aid the successful litigant who secured a decree, it is
deemed in civil contempt ;30 when the court's purpose is to vindicate its au-
thority, the proceeding is in criminal contempt.3 7 Only the court or a United
States attorney may institute criminal contempt proceedings, but the court
often appoints the plaintiff's attorney to prosecute the action.38 Civil contempt
proceedings are usually directed against only persons bound by the decree.
They include named defendants, their agents and employees, and persons in
active concert with them who have actual notice of the decree.39 Both persons
bound and any others who have actual notice of the decree can be made defen-
dants in a criminal contempt proceeding.40 Defendants in a civil contempt suit
have no right to a jury trial,41 nor in a criminal contempt case 42 unless the
"act or thing done or omitted" also constitutes a crime under a federal or state
35. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); Comment,
Cizil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 57 YALE L.J. 83 (1947) ; Moskovitz,
Contempt of Injunctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 COLUm. L. REv. 780 (1943) ; Wright, et al.,
supra note 2.
36. E.g., McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61 (1939); Lamb v. Cramer, 285 U.S.
217 (1932); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., supra note 35, at 441.
37. E.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302 (1947) ; Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) ; In re Reese, 107 Fed. 942 (8th
Cir. 1901); In re Rice, 181 Fed. 217, 220 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1910).
38. "A criminal contempt ... shall be prosecuted on notice .... The notice shall be
given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the defendant or, on application
of a United States attorney or of an attorney appointed by that court for that purpose, by
an order to show cause or an order of arrest. . . ." FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). See United
States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136, 138 (7th Cir. 1942) ; Western Fruit Growers,
Inc. v. Gotfried, 136 F.2d 98, 100-01 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Wright, et al., supra note 2, at 172.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d). See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 376-77
(1911) ; Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U.S. 624, 627 (1878) ; cf. Walling v. James V. Reuter,
Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 674 (1944) ; Moskovitz, supra note 35, at 813.
40. E.g., Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 329-30 (1904) ; United States
v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894) ; aff'd sub norn. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895);
Kelton v. United States, 294 Fed. 491 (3d Cir. 1923). Courts do not often cite persons
not named in the order for civil contempt, but there is no reluctance to cite persons not
named for criminal contempt if defiance of the court's authority is shown. E.g., United
States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906), United States v. Debs, supra; Kelton v. United
States, supra. See Note, 46 HARv. L. REv. 1311 (1933).
41. E.g., Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42,
65 (1924) (dictum) ; United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 9 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 869 (1951) ; Odell v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 91 F.2d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 1937);
Marcus v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 23 F.2d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 1927).
It has been suggested that 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (1952), formerly 29 U.S.C..§ 111 (1940),
gives the right to a jury trial to defendants in a civil contempt suit which arises out of
violation of an injunction issued under the federal labor laws. Wright, et al., supra note 2,
at 174; Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 83, 95 (1947). However, the provision has never been held
applicable to civil contempt; it has, indeed, been incorporated into Title 18 of the United
States Code, which is entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure."
42. E.g., In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895) ; Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S.
31, 39 (1990) ; Maynard v. United States, 23 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1927).
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statute and is committed outside the presence of the court.43 In civil contempt,
plaintiff must prove defendant's resistance by clear and convincing evidence,
44
and the defendant's good faith or willfulness is immaterial.43 Guilt in criminal
contempt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and willful disobedience
must be established.4 Although a defendant may be prosecuted for criminal
and civil contempt in the same proceeding, the criminal aspect governs the
applicable procedural rules and safeguards. 47 And where the proceeding is in
criminal contempt, reversal of the decree which has been violated will not bar
the contempt prosecution.
48
Civil contempt sanctions are remedial, and include both compensatory fines
and conditional fines or imprisonment.49 A defendant can relieve himself from
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1952), Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M.
& 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924). Section 3691 by its terms is inapplicable to contempts
committed in disobedience of any lawful order entered in a suit prosecuted in the name
of, or on behalf of, the United States. Although it has been suggested that § 3691 was
designed to grant jury trial rights in civil as well as criminal contempt proceedings when
the contemptuous conduct violated a state or federal statute, Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 83,
94 (1947), thus far the courts have held the statute applies only to criminal contempt.
Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., supra at 65; United
States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 9 (8th Cir. 1951) ; Marcus v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 23 F.2d
303, 305 (3d Cir. 1927). However, a defendant in a criminal contempt suit has a right
to a jury trial "in any case in which an act of Congress provides." FED. R. CrIu. P. 42(b).
The statutes specifically giving jury trial rights in criminal contempt proceedings are listcd
in note 3 to rule 42, Notes of Advisory Committee on. Rules, Fun. R. Cam. P. 42, 18
U.S.C.A. § 3001 (1951).
44. E.g., Fox v. Capital Co., 96 F.2d 684, 686 (3d Cir. 1938); Telling v. Bellows-
Claude Neon Co., 77 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1935); Hanly v. Pacific Live Stock Co., 234 Fed.
522, 531 (9th Cir. 1916).
45. E.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1948); West Texas
Util. Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1953);
Morse-Starret Products Co. v. Steccone, 205 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1953) ; NLRB v.
Whittier Mills Co., 123 F.2d 725, 727 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Lustgarten v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg.
Co., 92 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Evans v. International Typographical Union, 81 F. Supp.
675 (S.D. Ind. 1948). See Note, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 860 (1950).
46. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947) (willful
disobedience); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911) (proof
beyond a reasonable doubt) ; United States ex rel. Porter v. Kroger Grocery & Baking
Co., 163 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1947) (defendant successfully avoided criminal contempt
sanction because there was no substantial evidence that he willfully and knowingly
violated an injunction secured by the OPA).
47. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 591 (1947); United States v. United Mine
Workers, supra note 46, at 300-01 ; Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 Fed. 565, 572-73 (1st
Cir. 1911).
"The fact however that the two forms of contempt may be joined in the same proceeding
and a judgment rendered appropriate to each form furnishes no support for the proposition
that a judgment for civil contempt can be supported by a proceeding which was initiated
and carried through solely as a criminal contempt." Tobin v. Pielet, 186 F.2d 8S6, 890
(7th Cir. 1951).
48. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 294 (1947).
49. See, e.g., Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947) (conditional imprisonment);
United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304-05 (1947) (conditional fine) ;
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these conditional penalties by complying with the decree. Punitive fines or
fixed terms of imprisonment are the usual sanctions in a criminal contempt
proceeding, 0 but conditional penalties have on occasion been imposed.51 If the
act of criminal contempt also constitutes a state or federal crime, punishment
is limited to a $1,000 fine or six months imprisonment5 2 Although the court
whose order was violated has absolute discretion in withholding punishment
for criminal contempt, a plaintiff's right to remedial relief in a civil contempt
proceeding is not entirely dependent on the court's exercise of discretion. 3
Tort immunity of public officials has not prevented the imposition of civil con-
tempt sanctions in the form of compensatory fines payable to the aggrieved
party. Contempt proceedings are considered sui generis so that the imposition
of compensatory fines, despite its similarity td a verdict in damages, is not the
"tort liability" from which some officials are immune. Furthermore, the judi-
cial power necessary to enforce court orders and command respect overrides
the policy supporting the immunity doctrine.
Virtually all members of the educational hierarchy may be cited for con-
tempt if they directly interfere with district court decrees ordering integration.
Civil contempt sanctions may be imposed upon all persons named in the decree
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441-42 (1911); West Texas Util.
Co. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 442, 449 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1953) (condi-
tional fine) ; Sauber v. Whetstone, 199 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1952) (conditional commitment) ;
In re Nevett, 117 Fed. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902) (conditional commitment of county court
judges to coerce obedience to federal district court mandamus).
The alternative sanctions of civil contempt afford flexibility in enforcement. Compare
Woods v. O'Brien, 78 F. Supp. 221 (D.C. Mass. 1948), with United States v. United Mine
Workers, supra. In J'oods the landlady of a boardinghouse was enjoined by the district
court in a suit by the housing expediter on behalf of one of her elderly roomers, to clean his
room periodically. Upon her refusal to do so she was adjudged in civil contempt and fined
fifty dollars, five dollars of which was to compensate the lodger for his injury and
forty-five dollars conditional on the landlady's future continuous obedience. In United
M:ne Workcrs $2,800,000 of the contempt fine imposed was conditional on compliance
with the restraining order.
50. Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 593 (1947) ; United States v. United Mine
Workers, supra note 49 ($700,000 punitive fine) ; Moore v. United States, 150 F.2d 323
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 740 (1945) ($5,000 punitive fine); Rapp v. United
States, 146 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1944) (thirty-day jail sentence); In re Reese, 107 Fed.
942 (8th Cir. 1901) (three-month prison term).
51. E.g., Application of Patterson, 125 F. Supp. 881, 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 219
F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955) (ninety-day jail sentence conditional on compliance).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1952). But the third paragraph of § 402 makes this limitation
inapplicable both to contempts committed in the presence of the court (or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice), and to contempts committed in
disobedience to judicial orders entered in any suit brought in the name of or on behalf of
the United States.
53. In reversing a refusal by the district court to find a party in civil contempt for
violation of the district court decree, the Court in McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336
U.S. 187, 191 (1949), said: "[T]he grant or withholding of remedial relief [in civil con-
tempt] is not wholly discretionary with the judge.... ." See also Union Tool Co. v. Wilson,
259 U.S. 107, 112 (1922) ; Parker v. United States, 153 F2d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 1946).
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and their subordinates through whom the court's commands must ultimately
be implemented.54 The district court decrees may name only the defendant
boards of education, or they may specify the various classes of school officials
which are to carry out their mandates. Knowing acquiescence in the disobedi-
ence of subordinates is civil contempt,5 and a party has been held liable in civil
contempt for the disobedience of his subordinates even when he had no knowl-
edge of their wrongful actsY6 Whether or not school boards order integration
to proceed, teachers and administrative officials are subject to a civil contempt
suit if they fail to act.57 Subordinates cannot immunize themselves from civil
contempt by claiming that they were obligated to obey their superiors.05 If
resistance by these parties is violent or flagrant, the court may choose to prose-
cute for criminal rather than civil contempt, or it may allow a mixed proceed-
ing.5
9
54. "Not only is such an injunction [restraining the corporation and those associated
with it] enforcible by contempt proceedings against the corporation, its agents and officers
and those individuals associated with it in the conduct of business . . . but it may also in
appropriate circumstances, be enforced against those to whom the business may have been
transferred, whether as a means of evading the judgment or for other reasons." Walling
v. James V. Renter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 674 (1944) ; see Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 376 (1911) (president of corporation committed for civil contempt for failure to
obey order addressed to corporation); Reliance Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 143 F.2d 761 (7th
Cir. 1944) (corporation, its agents and officers, including some of its supervisory employees,
held in contempt for violating restraining order) ; NLRB v. Rath Packing Co., 130 F.2d
540 (8th Cir. 1942) ; L. E. Waterman Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 202 Fed. 172 (6th Cir.
1913); Bernard v. Frank, 179 Fed. 516 (2d Cir. 1910).
55. E.g., NLRB v. Rath Packing Co., supra note 54. In this case the NLRB secured
a court order requiring the Rath Packing Company to disestablish a company union.
Supervisory employees of Rath formally disbanded the company union and immediately
set up a new union that was the alter ego of the company union. Both the company and
its supervisory employees were held in civil contempt. See NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning
Co., 104 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1939) ; cf. International Union United Mine Workers v. United
States, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871 (1949) (union held guilty of
criminal contempt where court felt it was obvious that a positive order by its president
would have put an end to disobedience of an injunction even though the president had
not formally ordered disobedience).
56. Telling v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 77 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1935). Contra, United
States v. Taystee Baking Co., 55 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Tex. 1944).
57. See note 39 .supra; Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U.S. 624, 627 (1878).
58. See Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1951), appeal dismissed, 344
U.S. 806 (1952) ; cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 306 (1946).
However, the disobedience of a subordinate in conformance to a superior's orders may in
some situations enable the subordinate to defend a charge of civil contempt by asserting
inability to comply. Cf. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56 (1948) ; Parker v. United States,
126 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1942). And subordinates may also be able to defend criminal
contempt because their disobedience is not willful. See note 46 supra. Inability to comply
has been held to be a valid defense to a criminal contempt prosecution, Healey v. United
States, 186 F2d 164, 171 (9th Cir. 1950), probably because it indicates the absence
of willful disobedience.
59. See note 47 supra.
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Many forms of indirect interference by the school hierarchy will also be
actionable as contempt. Persons bound by the decree who undertake evasive
action take the risk that the court will impose civil sanctions without inform-
ing them in advance that a particular type of behavior violates the decree.60
The federal courts repeatedly state that the spirit as well as the letter of their
commands must be obeyed, that the substance rather than the form of conduct
determines whether or not a contempt has been committed. 6' Failure of persons
bound by the court's orders to take action within their power to prevent others
from hindering performance has been held to be actionable as a contempt.62 A
court may even be willing to deem action taken in anticipation of a forthcom-
ing decree a contempt if the action has enabled the parties to nullify the
decree.0 3
60. "[Defendants] undertook to make their own determination of what the decree
meant. They knew they acted at their peril ...
"It does not lie in [defendants'] ...mouths to say that they have an immunity from
civil contempt because the plan or scheme they adopted was not specifically enjoined. Such
a rule would give tremendous impetus to the program of experimentation with disobedience
of the law which we condemned in Maggio v. Zeitz. . . . The instant case is an excellent
illustration of how it could operate to prevent accountability for persistent contumacy. Civil
contempt is avoided today by showing that the specific plan adopted by respondents was
not enjoined. Hence a new decree is entered enjoining that particula? plan. Thereafter
defendants work out a plan that was not specifically enjoined. Immunity is once more
obtained because the new plan was not specifically enjoined. And so a whole series of
wrongs is perpetrated and a decree of enforcement goes for naught." McComb v. Jackson-
ville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1949).
See also NLRB v. Rath Packing Co., 130 F.2d 540 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Philipe v. Window
Glass Cutters League, 99 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Ark. 1951); Economist Furnace Co. v.
Wrought Iron Range Co., 86 Fed. 1010 (C.C.D. Ind. 1898).
61. See cases cited note 60 supra; Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 170 F.2d
783, 786 (7th Cir. 1948); John B. Stetson Co. v. Stephen L. Stetson Co., 128 F.2d 981,
983 (2d Cir. 1942); In re Rice, 181 Fed. 217, 221 (C.C.M.D. Ala. 1910); Bernard v.
Frank, 179 Fed. 516 (2d Cir. 1910); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Gillett, 30 Fed. 683
(C.C.D.N.J. 1887) ; cf. Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U.S. 671, 674 (1944).
62. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906). After a state court had convicted
a Negro for rape of a white woman, the Supreme Court ordered Sheriff Shipp to retain
the prisoner in his custody to allow the prisoner to prosecute an appeal before the Supreme
Court. On allegations that although the sheriff expected a lynching mob, he left the jail
inadequately guarded with the result that a mob was able to break into the jail and hang the
prisoner, the Supreme Court held that the allegations were sufficient to charge a contempt
of the Supreme Court.
63. In Parker v. United States, 126 F2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1942), a regulation
under the Agricultural Adjustment Act required a corporation controlled by defendant
to make certain payments to the market administrator. Shortly after the regulation became
effective, defendant entered into a "studied course of conduct over a long period of time" by
which he rendered the corporation financially incapable of complying with decrees which
where ultimately obtained under the regulation. The First Circuit held that defendant was
in civil contempt of the decrees and that an appropriate sanction for his contempt was a
compensatory fine payable to the administrator, with provision for commitment of defendant
until he paid the fine. Cf. NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 207 F.2d 798, 802 (6th Cir. 1953).
But see United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 341 (1950) : "There is, in our jurisprudence,
no doctrine of anticipatory contempt."
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It will not be difficult for the courts to use these principles to combat segre-
gation within a nominally interracial school, publicly subsidized "private"
schools, or a school district using the so-called individual assignment circum-
vention device. 4 The last practice is already authorized by legislation in Ala-
bama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana and North Carolina. 5 The statutes authorize
school officials to place students in schools for which they are best fitted, and
it is expected that the administrators will use vague criteria such as fitness
to maintain a bi-racial school system. Officials who systematically segregate
Negro students by these three devices can be prosecuted for civil contempt
whether or not the practice is authorized by state law. Such activity constitutes
violation of the spirit of a desegregation decree. Once such disobedience is
shown, plaintiff's right to remedial relief is not impaired by the disobeying
party's good faith or lack of intent to defy the court."6 However, the courts
will probably declare legislative circumvention programs to be a denial of equal
protection of the laws before they are willing to hold school officials in con-
tempt for merely complying with the mandates of the legislature. This deter-
mination may be made in a suit for a declaratory judgment plus injunctive
relief.67 The parties administering these programs would then have unequivo-
cal notice that continuation of their behavior would constitute a contempt. But
where school boards and officials are discriminating independently of the legis-
lature, the courts may be less likely to warn them of the contemptuous charac-
ter of their conduct before imposing contempt sanctions. Experimentation in
disobedience is not to be encouraged.6 8
64. See text at note 29 supra.
65. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1955, p. 26, cols. 5, 7; Southern School News, Feb. 1956, p. 2.
66. See note 45 supra; cf. United States v. Murray, 61 F. Supp. 415 (E.D. Mo. 1945)
(city officials held in contempt for threatening to arrest OPA officials if they inspected
food lockers under court orders without first obtaining health certificates required by city
ordinance).
The imposition of civil contempt sanctions in the form of a conditional fine or commit-
ment would not be harsh even when the officials are acting only in pursuance of state law.
These sanctions will be inoperative if the officials immediately obey.
67. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1952) allows a person to bring suit for a declaratory
judgment as soon as an "actual controversy" exists. Since Brown has given Negro students
an immediate right to start the process of gradual court enforcement of desegregation,
see text at notes 9-18 suepra, an actual controversy would exist as soon as statutes arc
enacted or practices are instituted which tend to defeat that right. If the evasion device
is embodied in a state statute, a suit in the federal courts to enjoin its operation may be
brought only in a three-judge district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1952). The three-judge
court, however, often may not restrain the enforcement of a newly enacted, allegedly
unconstitutional statute until the plaintiff is given a reasonable time to obtain a construction
of the statute by the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (1952), Shipman v. Du Pre, 339 U.S. 321
(1950). Section 2284 does not by its terms require such a stay, and it may not be required
where immediate, serious injury is threatened, and where the court feels that no uncertain
questions of interpretation are presented. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 (1948).
See Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HAgv. L. REv. 377,
424-25 (1954).
68. See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192 (1949).
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Economic coercion may be difficult to reach by contempt proceedings.6 9
Economic resistance by named parties has been deemed a civil contempt, but
this type of interference is usually undertaken by individuals not bound by the
decree and thus not amenable to civil contempt7 0 However, if the persons
exerting economic coercion act in concert with the school hierarchy under a
plan of organized interference, these persons might also be subject to suit in
civil contempt.7 1 It may even be difficult to use criminal contempt to combat
economic resistance undertaken by persons not bound. The courts have seldom
punished such persons for nonviolent conduct which frustrates compliance with
a decree. But if violent coercion and picketing can subject nonparties to a
criminal contempt prosecution,72 there is no theoretical reason for treating the
more subtle techniques differently. Even if a prosecution for criminal contempt
were possible, however, it would be especially difficult to establish the willful-
ness required by that proceeding.
Even initial judicial resistance may possibly be reached by civil contempt
proceedings. A superior tribunal has the power to imprison judges on inferior
tribunals until they obey its commands, although such power is rarely exer-
cised.7 3 If district judges refuse to require defendants to make a prompt and
reasonable start, plaintiffs may apply to the appellate court for a mandamus.
If the judge still refuses, plaintiffs should be able to sue the district judge in
the appellate court for civil contempt.7 4 If plaintiffs can demonstrate the judge's
disobedience by clear and convincing evidence, the appellate court does not have
69. For discussion of the nature of the economic resistance to be expected, see note 28
supra and accompanying text; U.S. News & World Report, May 28, 1954, pp. 21-24.
70. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
71. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ; text at note 39 supra. See also L. E. Waterman Co.
v. Standard Drug Co., 202 Fed. 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1913) (person not otherwise bound
by injunction cited for contempt in that he "aided and assisted" the company in disobeying
the injunction).
72. E.g., United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724, 762-66 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), aff'd Msb
nora. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) ; McCourtney v. United States, 291 Fed. 497 (8th
Cir. 1923); Mackall v. Ratchford, 82 Fed. 41 (C.C.D.W. Va. 1897); See Moskovitz,
Contempt of Injnctions Civi! and Criminal, 43 COL.um. L. Rxv. 780, 799 (1943).
73. Cf. In re Nevett, 117 Fed. 448 (8th Cir. 1902). In this case the Eighth Circuit
held that a United States district court did not err in committing judges of the County
Court of St. Clair, Missouri for contempt of a mandamus issued by the district court.
However, it is not clear from the report whether the county court was a court of general
jurisdiction. See also In re Copenhaver, 54 Fed. 660 (C.C.WiD. Mo. 1893). Superior
state tribunals have held lower court judges in contempt for failure to comply with a
mandamus. People ex rel. Bristol v. Pearson, 4 Ill. 270 (1841) ; cf. Ex parte Carnochan,
1 Ga. Rep. Ann. 109 (Super. Ct., Chatham Cty. 1810). And no reason appears for denying
the same remedy if a federal court issues a mandamus to a lower federal court. See 18
U.S.C. § 401(3) (1952).
74. Mandamus may be unnecessary if it is clear that the district court is disobedient,
because a Brown-type order is directed to the district court. See notes 7-8 supra and
accompanying text. Disobedience by the court would then come within 18 U.S.C. § 401 (3)
(1952) : "A court of the United States shall have the power to punish by fine and imprison-
ment such contempt of its authority and none other, as -... (3) disobedience to its lawful
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command."
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unlimited discretion to deny remedial relief.7r And a district judge who dis-
obeys a Supreme Court order addressed to him becomes subject to the virtually
unlimited contempt powers of that Court.76 After a start towards integration
has been made, it will be extraordinarily difficult to contend successfully that
district court grants of additional time were made in disobedience of the
appellate decree, so that time extensions will lie almost wholly within the dis-
cretion of the district court.77 But if the lapse of a long period produces no
advance towards desegregation, Negro plaintiffs may be able to show that the
factors which the appellate order permitted the lower court to consider could
never have justified the long delay.7* \ While it is most unlikely that contempt
sanctions will be applied against district court judges, the possibility illustrates
the broad reach of the contempt power.79
The rule that a decree must give specific commands before contempt pro-
ceedings may be brought for its violation is not apt to curb the efficacy of the
contempt power in combatting direct or indirect interference. 80 The appellate
courts may justifiably consider some district court decrees too vague to give
parties or nonparties a precise idea of their obligations. But parties and non-
parties have often been deemed in contempt for violation of decrees of consider-
75. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
76. It is still an unsettled question whether Congress can limit the contempt power of
the Supreme Court by legislation, since, unlike the lower federal courts, the Supreme Court
is a creature not of statute but of the Constitution. See Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). An illustration of the broad nature of the contempt power of the
Supreme Court is found in United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 575 (1906).
77. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ; see text at note 17 supra.
78. "[T]he power of a trial court to act in any litigation after the issuance of a mandate
on appeal is limited by an obligation to do nothing contrary to either the letter or spirit
of the mandate, as explained or elucidated in the opinion." Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v.
Howells Sales Co., 287 Fed. 100, 102 (2d Cir. 1923). Cf. Ex parte Morris, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 605, 607 (1869).
79. The ability of the appellate court to enter the order that it feels the lower court
should have entered may provide an easier way of circumventing recalcitrant district
court judges. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1952), Troyak v. Enos, 204 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1953). If
the appellate court can enter such an order, any violation would be a contempt punishable
directly by the appellate court. But it has been held that the appellate court may not
dictate the judgment where it cannot finally dispose of the case. Warsaw-Wilkinson Cu.
v. Exchange Mut. Life Ins. Co., 192 Fed. 666 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1910). Appellate court order.
would rarely be able to dispose finally of a desegregation case, especially since Broain
stated that the problem of implementation was one primarily within the cognizance of th
district courts. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
80. "Certainly before one may be punished for contempt for violating a court order,
the terms of such order should be clear and specific, and leave no doubt or uncertainty
in the minds of those to whom it is addressed." McFarland v. United States, 295 Fed. 64, 65o
(7th Cir. 1923).
See also Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17, 29 (1924), and NLRB v.
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 195 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1952), illustrating the
difficulty of obtaining a contempt conviction when the decree is vaguely worded. Cf. J. I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 341 (1944). See Note, 54 COLU-M. L. R-v. 603 (1954).
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able generality. 81 And there is imposing authority for the proposition that
the decree should be broad enough to prevent evasion.82 Where a proclivity
for resistance has been shown, broad general commands are permissible so as
not to facilitate experimentation with evasionary devices.8 3 In addition, failure
to move for a dissolution or modification of a court order before engaging in
possibly contemptuous conduct has been held to estop parties from defending
a contempt prosecution on the ground that the order was vague or ambiguous.
84
When Negro plaintiffs have a choice between civil and criminal contempt,
they will find it advantageous.to invoke civil contempt rather than ask the court
to initiate criminal proceedings. Although the courts can institute criminal con-
tempt whenever they deem resistance by bound parties to be flagrant or violent,
this is rarely done unless plaintiff complains to the court that the resistance is
of such a serious nature as to require a punitive sanction.8 5 On the other hand
plaintiffs can always institute civil contempt on their own behalf.88 The civil
proceeding will not require either a jury trial,87 proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, or proof of willful disobedience.8 8 For criminal contempt a jury trial
81. Excerpts from the injunction in the famous Debs case are illustrative of a broadly
worded injunction that has both specific and "catch all" provisions: "[D]efendants and
all persons combining and conspiring with them and all persons whosoever, were com-
manded and enjoined to desist and refrain-
'(1) From in any way or manner interfering with, obstructing or stopping any of the
business of any of the following named railroads. . . . (2) From in any way interfering
with. . . . [various] trains . . . (4) From in any manner interfering with, injuring or
destroying the property of any of said railroads ... (10) From doing any act whatever
in furtherance of any conspiracy or combination to restrain ... said railroad companies or
receivers in the free and unhindered control and handling of interstate commerce over the
lines of such railroads . . . (11) From ordering, directing, aiding, assisting, or abetting,
in any mnanner whatever any person or persons to commit any or either of the acts afore-
said,' " United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724, 726-27 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1894), aff'd sub nom.
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). (Emphasis added.) See Cassidy v. Puett Elec. Starting
Gate Corp., 182 F.2d 604, 605 (4th Cir. 1950). Here defendants and their associates were
enjoined from "directly or indirectly and . . . from in any way infringing any claim of
said Patent . . . under pains and penalties that may fall thereon. Hereof fail not at your
peril."
82. "[Tjhe United States is entitled to effective relief. To that end the decree should
enjoin acts of the sort that are shown by the evidence to have been done or threatened in
furtherance of the conspiracy. It should be broad enough to prevent evasion." (Emphasis
added.) Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S.
293, 299 (1934). See McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1949);
May Stores Co. v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 391 (1945).
83. See, e.g., McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra note 82, at 192.
84. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949); Economist Furnace
Co. v. Wrought Iron Range Co., 86 Fed. 1010, 1011 (C.C.D. Ind. 1898) (dictum).
85. See, e.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 267 (1947)
Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 109 Fed. 565 (1st Cir. 1911).
86. Wright, et al., Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167,
172 (1955), and cases there cited. See Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., supra note 85 (plaintiff
institutes mixed contempt proceeding).
87. See note 41 supra.
VS. See notes 44-45 supra.
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will often be necessary because the resistance may also violate a state or federal
statute.89 Violence will often violate state statutes, and any resistance may con-
stitute a federal offense under the Civil Rights Acts. 0 Both Southern district
judges and Southern juries may be unsympathetic to integration at present,
but the judges' life tenure enables them to be relatively independent of local
opinion, and their respect for higher judicial authority may well override any
personal dislike of the task they have been commanded to perform.,'
THE CIVIL RIGHTS AcTs
Although resistance may be most effectively neutralized through use of the
contempt power, the Civil Rights Acts afford alternative and supplementary
enforcement weapons.0 2 Brown and Bowling hold school segregation to be a
denial of equal protection in the states and of Fifth Amendment due process
in the District of Columbia.93 These rights are protected by several surviving
provisions of the Civil Rights Acts. Sections 241 and 242 of the Criminal Code
and sections 1983 and 1985 (3) of title 42 are the provisions which can be used
to combat much of the expected resistance. 94 Unlike the federal contempt
power, use of the CRA depends only on the existence of a protected right and
not on the existence of a decree which has been violated.95
Under section 242 of the Criminal Code anyone acting under color of law
who willfully deprives another of the equal protection of the laws may be in-
dicted for a misdemeanor, punishable by a $1,000 fine or a one-year prison
89. See note 43 supra.
90. See text at notes 96-110 infra.
91. Unlike state executive officials, federal district court judges have neither stated nor
intimated that they will not enforce the commands of the Supreme Court. Indeed, recent
decisions of the federal courts indicate that the district courts are seriously attempting to
comply with the Brown mandates. E.g., Hoxie School District No. 46 v. Brewer, 135 F.
Supp. 296 (E.D. Ark. 1955), temporary injunction made permanent, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2323
(E.D. Ark. Jan. 9, 1956) (discussed at note 27 supra); McSwain v. County Board of
Education, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2323 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 4, 1956) (federal district court in
Tennessee orders Anderson County to complete desegregation before the beginning of
the 1956 Fall term); Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 177 (W.D. Ky. 1955) (discussed
at note 22 supra); Frasier v. Board of Trustees, 134 F. Supp. 589 (M.D.N.C. 1955),
aff'd, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 3232 (U.S. March 5, 1956) (three-judge district court in North
Carolina rejected contention that Brown is applicable only to public elementary and high
schools and held that the University of North Carolina cannot refuse to process appli-
cations for admission solely because the applicants are Negroes). Nineteen rulings involv-
ing school segregation that have been promulgated since the date of the Brown decree
are briefly summarized in Southern School News, Feb. 1956, p. 1, col. 1.
92. See, generally, Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50
MICH. L. Rm,. 1323 (1952) ; Poole, Statutory Remedies for the Protection of Civil Rights,
32 ORE. L. RZEV. 210 (1953) ; Putzel, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Ap-
praisal, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1951).
93. See text at notes 4-5 supra.
94. See notes 96, 106, 111, 121 infra.
95. See note 34 snpra. For a discussion of the desegregation rights which are protected,
see text at notes 9-18 supra.
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term or both."" And if private parties act in concert with state officials who
are committing a section 242 offense, both may be prosecuted for a conspiracy
to violate the statuteY7 This surviving section of the original Civil Rights Acts
has been used primarily to punish deprivations of the right to due process and
equal protection in a law enforcement context where violence was present, 98
but there exists no legal impediment to its use to punish a denial of equal
protection in a state school system.90 The Supreme Court has affirmatively
declared that section 242 was enacted to enforce the rights protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, particularly to combat discrimination against
Negroes.100 Since Brown has made it clear that school segregation violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, section 242 can be used against state school officials
96. "Whoever under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, will-
fully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant
being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of
citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both."
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952), formerly 18 U.S.C. § 52 (1926).
97. "If two or more persons conspire ... to commit any offense against the United
States ... and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.
"If, however, the offense the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor." 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952). This statute was
applied to reach private parties for a conspiracy to violate § 242 in Brown v. United States,
204 F.2d 247, 249 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Koehler v. United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951);
Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93, 98-99 (8th Cir. 1942).
98. E.g., Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) (conviction of a detective who
mistreated prisoner) ; United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953) (same) ; Koeh-
ler v. United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951) (conviction of law officer who mistreated
prisoner); Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951) (conviction of police
officers who yielded Negro prisoners to non-officer Klansmen who subjected them to physi-
cal brutality).
99. In United States v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1882), a teacher of the
only public school in a subdistrict in Clermont County, Ohio, refused to allow certain
Negro children to attend the school. The teacher was indicted under the statutory pre-
decessor to § 242 and the circuit judge's charge to the jury included the following: "If,
therefore, this defendant did exclude the colored boy named in the indictment from the
privileges of the school taught by him, after being requested by the trustees of the sub-
district to permit him to enter it, claiming the right to do so under authority of the statute
providing for the separate education of colored children in schools to be established and
maintained for that purpose, and did so on account of his color, the court instructs you that
you ought to find him guilty as charged unless you shall find in his favor the question of
fact to which I will hereafter direct your attention .... [But if you shall find] there was
such a school in the district ... affording substantially the same educational advantages
as were afforded by the school from which the prosecuting witness was excluded, it was
his duty to have come there, and the defendant did him no wrong in the exclusion com-
plained of." Id. at 732, 735.
100. "Sec. 20 [§ 242] was enacted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945). See also Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 137
(1954) (concurring opinion per Clark, J.).
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who continue to enforce segregation in opposition to the commands of a dis-
trict court. Section 242 liability ensues whether or not the action is authorized
by state law,101 and even if the official is merely enforcing the commands of a
superior officer.
10 2
Deliberate official inaction, particularly the failure of state law enforcement
officials to take feasible action to protect those asserting their constitutional
rights from mob violence, has been held to subject such officers to the penalties
of section 242.103 Although it is only within the law enforcement context that
inaction has prompted a section 242 prosecution, failure of school officials to
use all their available powers to implement desegregation as ordered may also
constitute a denial of equal protection, punishable under 242. If law enforce-
ment officials can be indicted for failing to use their available powers to prevent
a mob from attacking Negro children on the way to an integrated school,
school board members and school officials who fail to use all their powers to
afford these children an integrated school should be in no better position. A
full development of the incipient doctrine that inaction may constitute a denial
of equal protection under section 242 would result in application of the statute
not only to direct failure in complying with a district court order, but also to
the failure of school officials to attempt to discipline striking white students,
and to the acquiescence by school board members in discriminatory practices
by lower school officials.
A limitation on the effectiveness of section 242 may result from the require-
ment that the defendant be shown to have been motivated by a specific intent
to deprive his victim of a constitutional right. 104 The requirement is apt to
prove troublesome in cases of nonsystematic discrimination against selected
Negroes, or of failure by law enforcement officials to protect Negro school
children from mob violence, for in these cases defendants can argue that their
101. E.g., Screws v. United States, supra note 100, at 107-08; Williams v. United
States, 179 F.2d 656, 660 (5th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
102. See United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721, 730 (7th Cir. 1953). Although it
reversed a § 242 conviction for procedural errors, the Seventh Circuit saw no error in the
district court's refusal to instruct the jury to acquit officers who failed to protect Negroes
from mob violence merely because the officers were acting pursuant to orders from their
superior officers.
103. E.g., Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1951) (abstracted at
note 98 supra) ; Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902, 907 (4th Cir. 1943). In this case
a deputy sheriff allowed a town mob to abuse and restrain Jehovah's Witnesses who sought
his protection before they attempted to proselytize in the town. On appeal a judgment
against Catlette imposing a $1,000 fine and a twelve-month prison term was sustained on
the alternative ground that Catlette's inaction constituted a denial of equal protection
actionable under § 242. Cf. United States v. Konovsky, supra note 102, at 729; United
States v. Blackburn, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14, at 1158 (W.D. Mo. 1874).
104. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Recent cases applying the require-
ment of Screws indicate that the appellate court will not reverse a conviction as long a,
the judge's charge includes a statement to the effect that defendants must have intended
to deprive their victim of a specific constitutional right. E.g., Clark v. United States, 193
F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Koehler v. United States, 189 F.2d 711 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Williams
v. United States, 179 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
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conduct was prompted by other motives. Officials who systematically and
deliberately segregate all Negro children will find it more difficult to prove
they had no purpose to deprive Negroes of their constitutional rights; for it
may be argued that the required intent is implicit in the systematic segregation
of the races. 1°0
Under section 241 of the Criminal Code any persons who conspire to deprive
a citizen of certain constitutional rights face maximum punishments of a $5,000
fine or ten years in prison or both." 6 The statute has been construed to protect
only those rights arising from the relation of the citizen to the federal govern-
ment, and not the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state
infringement. 0 7 Section 241 has been held to protect the right of a citizen to
institute contempt proceedings for violation of a federal court order, 0 8 and it
should also protect his right to institute proceedings in the federal courts for
the purpose of asserting federally recognized rights.'00 Thus, section 241 would
be applicable against any conspiracy designed to intimidate Negroes from in-
105. See Note, 40 GEo. L.J. 566 (1952).
106. "If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any
citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having exercised the same; or
"If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway,... with intent to prevent or
hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured-
They shall be fined not more than $5,000 nor imprisoned not more than ten years or
both." 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1952), formerly 18 U.S.C. § 51 (1926).
107. United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951). This proposition was enunciated
by Justice Frankfurter in the opinion of the Court, but on this issue the justices were even-
ly divided. Justices Douglas, Burton, Reed and Clark felt that § 241 also embraced a con-
spiracy to deprive a citizen of the rights protected by § 242. Black concurred with Frank-
furter, Jackson, Minton and Vinson for an independent reason. If the question is ever re-
considered by the Court, the position of the dissenters may prevail, for all four dissenters
are still on the Court, while only two justices remain who concurred in the opinion of the
Court. See discussion of § 241 in EmFRSON & HABER, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS 70
(1952).
In the recent case of Hoxie School District No. 46 v. Brewer, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2323
(E.D. Ark. Jan. 9, 1956), the court in a dictum implied that interference by private persons
with the rights of Negro pupils granted by the Fourteenth Amendment is actionable under
f241.
108. United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885 (C.C.W.D. Ga. 1890).
109. In Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), § 241 was used to punish con-
spirators who intimidated a private citizen in the exercise of his right to notify a United
States marshall of a violation of the internal revenue laws. Accord, In re Quarles, 158
U.S. 532 (1895). A citizen who attempts to notify a court of a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and who attempts to make use of the court machinery provided for protection
of those rights should be similarly protected. See also Foss v. United States, 266 Fed. 881
(9th Cir. 1920) ( 241 used to punish persons who conspired to intimidate a citizen from
exercising his right to appear as a witness in a land contest held pursuant to federal law).
Section 241 should also be of use in punishing interference, by federal officials and pri-
vate persons within the District of Columbia, of the Negro child's right to attend integrated
schools. This right, being guaranteed against infringement by the federal government, can
certainly be said to arise from the relation of the individual to the federal government.
Although the rights which the courts have thus far protected under § 241 have not arisen
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stituting Brown-type suits or from invoking the contempt powers of the federal
courts in order to combat resistance to their decrees. It should also be applicable
against members of an economic conspiracy fashioned in order to intimidate
Negroes into failing to assert their new rights by court action. Members of
the citizens councils already formed in Mississippi and elsewhere to withdraw
credit from Negro leaders, and otherwise to discourage by economic intimida-
tion the implementation of desegregation, could be indicted under this sec-
tion.1 10
Under section 1983 of title 42, Negro school children who are deprived of
their desegregation rights by persons acting under color of state law can sue
for damages or can obtain injunctive relief against such action.' If private
persons conspire with officials who are acting under color of state law, they too
are liable under section 1983.112 Although there is authority for the proposi-
tion that the rights protected by section 1983 are only those secured by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not the equal protection
clause, 113 the majority of the cases have assumed that section 1983 embraces
from the prohibitions on federal action embodied in the first ten amendments, no exclusion
of the latter class of rights from the coverage of the statute can be implied from the con-
trolling decision of United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
110. See Southern School News, Nov. 1955, p. 1. col. 4 (Oklahoma reports the first
organization of a Citizens Council, a movement spreading out of Mississippi into Alabama,
Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, Texas, and other states) ; U.S. News & World Report,
May 28, 1954, pp. 21-24.
111. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for re-
dress." 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952), formerly 8 U.S.C. § 43 (1946).
Damages have been awarded to plaintiffs for deprivations of constitutional rights, e.g.,
Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) ; Solomon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 96 F. Supp. 709
(S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; cf. Hobson v. York Studios, Inc., 145 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.
1955), and numerous decisions, in remanding cases for trial, have specifically sustained
plaintiffs' right to damages, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) ; Nixon v. Hem-
don, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) ; Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752
(4th Cir. 1955) ; McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955). See also Nash v. Air
Terminal Services, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 545, 549 (E.D. Va. 1949) (plaintiff entitled to "such
damages as may have been occasioned her.., and she need not, as contended by the defen-
dants, prove direct physical injury in order to recover damages").
112. "The 'individuals' are said to have conspired with the 'officials.' When, because
of the participation of 'officials,' action is taken which may be characterized as effecting a
deprivation, 'under color of law,' of rights secured by the Constitution, the 'individuals'
also fall within the strictures of [§ 1983]." Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp. 62, 70 (S.D.
N.Y. 1950). See also Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006, 1016-17 (W.D.
Ark.'1949), aff'd, 183 F.Td 440 (8th Cir. 1950); Condra v. Leslie & Clay Coal Co., 101
F. Supp. 774,777 (E.D. Ky. 1952).
1,13. Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561, 563 (7th Cir. 1954) (alternative holding) ; Jen-
nings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153, 154 (7th Cir. 1954) (dictum) ; McShane v. Moldovan, 172
F2d 1016, 1018 n.2 (6th Cir. 1949) (dictum) ; Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705, 706 (10th
Cir. 1948) (dictum).
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both sets of rights.114 The former proposition was first stated in a dictum by
the Tenth Circuit,"05 a dictum for which the court had no valid authority,
either from the previous cases, legislative history or the wording of the Civil
Rights Acts themselves.1 0 Courts which have followed this dictum seem to
have been influenced by the fact that a companion statute, section 1985(3),
refers in explicit terms to the right to equal protection," 7 whereas section 1983
refers only to the "rights secured by the Constitution.""18 From this they infer
that each section was designed to protect a separate right. But if this were so,
section 1985(3) probably would not have been confined to a conspiracy and
would not have provided only for a remedy in damages while section 1983
afforded a remedy against individuals both in law and equity."19 Furthermore,
suits by Negroes to compel equalization of school and recreational facilities,
grounded on a denial of equal protection, have often been brought under sec-
tion 1983, and the statutory relief has been given as a matter of course when
plaintiffs have been able to prove substantial inequality.
20
Whether section 1985(3) itself can be used to remedy deprivations of de-
segregation rights is doubtful. This statute authorizes suits against all persons
who conspire for the purpose of depriving anyone of the equal protection of
the laws; the plaintiff may recover damages if any of the conspirators have
114. "The equal protection of the laws is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment...
and by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981, and liability for deprivation of such right is provided by 42
U.S.C.A. § 1983." Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752, 753 (4th
Cir. 1955) (Negro woman required to change her seat in accord with South Carolina
segregation law held to have the right to sue the bus company for damages under § 1983) ;
McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608, 609 (10th Cir. 1955) (damage action for denial of equal
protection under § 1983) ; Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697, 704 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Westminster
School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Williams v. Kansas City, 104 F.
Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1952); Solomon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 96 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
"[Section 1983] includes the Fourteenth Amendment and such privileges and immunities
as are secured by the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as by the privileges
and immunities clause of that Amendment." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 526 (1939) (con-
curring opinion per Stone, J.).
115. Bottone v. Lindsley, 170 F.2d 705, 706 (10th Cir. 1948).
116. See Poole, Statutory Renedies for the Protection of Civil Rights, 32 OR.. L.
REv. 210, 218-20 (1953).
117. See note 121 infra.
118. See note 111 supra.
119. lbid.
120. E.g., Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Holmes
v. City of Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), aff'd, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) ;
Draper v. St. Louis, 92 F. Supp. 546 (E.D. "Mo.), appeal dismissed, 186 F.2d 307
(8th Cir. 1950) ; Pitts v. Board of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark. 1949) ; cf. Rice
v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948) ; Providence
Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186, 194-95 (D.R.I. 1950), aff'd, 190 F.2d 760 (1st
Cir.), ccrt. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951). And complaints brought under § 1983, alleging a
denial of equal protection, have been held to state causes of action. E.g., Bruce v. Stilwell,
206 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Kerr v. Enoch
Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
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injured him or his property, or have deprived him of his rights as a United
States citizen. 12 1 Presumably the "rights" referred to are not Fourteenth
Amendment rights but only those "national" rights which section 241 pro-
tects. 2 2 Therefore, section 1985(3) will usually aid a Negro child to protect
his desegregation rights only if personal injury or property damage is in-
volved.
1 23
Unlike section 1983, this statute is not by its terms limited to defendants
who act under color of law. But whether it can in fact be used effectively
against private persons remains to be seen. There are two formidable obstacles
to such a use of the statute. First, the Supreme Court in Collins v. Hardy-
man 124 has established a highly restrictive test of what constitutes a denial of
equal protection of the laws by private persons. 1 25 Under the Collins test,
defendants must at least seek to "influence" or "manipulate" the law, and there
is a suggestion that they must also prevent plaintiffs from obtaining redress for
the alleged wrongs in the state courts.1 2 6 The Court cited the activities of the
post-Civil War Ku Klux Klan as an example of conduct which "may" have
amounted to a denial of equal protection by private persons.
12 7
Even if modern segregationists do in some areas undertake action which will
satisfy the Collins test, constitutional problems pose a second obstacle to the
application of section 1985 (3). Whether Congress can impose civil liability on
private persons for denying others the equal protection of the laws has never
121. "If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on
the highway or on the premises of another for the purpose of depriving, either directly
or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering
the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons
within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws . . . in any case of con-
spiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be
done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured
in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of
a citizen of the United States, the party so injured may have an action for the recovery
of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against one or more of the con-
spirators." 12 STAT. 284 (1861), 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1952), formerly
8 U.S.C. § 47(3) (1946).
122. See Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1953). See also notes 107-10
supra and accompanying text.
123. The Seventh Circuit has suggested that the statute protects only "national" rights.
Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1953). See also Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp.
62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). The Eighth Circuit construes the statute to protect the Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection, but only against state infringement. Moffett v. Com-
merce Trust Co., 187 F.2d 242 (8th Cir. 1951). The statute has also been construed to
protect both sets of rights. Arkansas v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 102 F. Supp. 444,
447 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
124. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
125. For a discussion of what constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws by
state officials, see text at notes 139-46 infra.
126. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1951). See also McNutt v. United
Gas, Coke & Chemical Workers, CIO, 108 F. Supp. 871, 875-76 (W.D. Ark. 1952).
127. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651,662 (1951).
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been decided by the Supreme Court.128 A similar statute creating criminal lia-
bility was declared unconstitutional, 129 and the Seventh Circuit has suggested
that if section 1985(3) does extend to private action, it too is unconstitu-
tional.' - Since the application of the statute to private persons is so doubtful,
only those acting under color of law will normally be made defendants in a
civil suit under the Civil Rights Acts.1 3 1 And section 1983 reaches these per-
sons as well as private persons who conspire with them :132 so section 1983
will be the principal civil sanction for Negro children who seek to remedy
deprivations of their desegregation rights.
The application of the civil provisions of the CRA involve a number of
difficulties not present in the application of civil contempt sanctions. To re-
cover damages under the CRA a jury is necessary, 133 whereas compensatory
fines for violations of federal court decrees may be imposed without the inter-
vention of a jury. 34 In addition, the courts have promulgated three doctrines
which operate to limit the use of sections 1983 and 1985 (3).
The first difficulty results from the doctrine requiring the exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies before a party may resort to the federal courts. 35 At
least one Southern state has attempted to take advantage of this rule by pro-
viding for an involved, time-consuming system for review of decisions to place
students in schools for which they are best fitted. 136 But exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies has not been required where these remedies do not afford the
plaintiff review by disinterested parties or where the review system is of such
128. "It is apparent that if this complaint meets the requirements of this Act, it raises
constitutional problems of the first magnitude that, in the light of history, are not without
difficulty. These would include issues as to congressional power under and apart from the
Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived
from national as distinguished from state citizenship, and the question of separability of
the Act in its application to those two classes of rights . . . . We think that Congress has
not, in the narrow class of conspiracies defined by this statute, included the conspiracy
charged here. We therefore reach no constitutional questions." Id. at 659, 662.
129. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
130. Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1953).
131. As under § 241, private persons can be made defendants when "national" rights
are involved. See text at notes 107-10 supra.
132. See text at note 112 supra.
133. E.g., Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951).
134. See note 41 supra.
135. E.g., Natural Gas Co. v. Slattery, 302 U.S. 300, 310-11 (1937) ; Davis v. Arn,
199 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Cook v. Davis, 178 F.2d 595, 601 (5th Cir. 1949) ; Lane v.
Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 274 (1939) (dictum) ; see Carson v. Board of Education, 227 F.2d
789 (4th Cir. 1955). But state remedies having "the indicia of a conventional judicial
proceeding" need not be exhausted before suing for damages under the CRA. Lane v.
Wilson, supra at 274; Mitchell v. Wright, 154 F.2d 924, cert. denied, 329 U.S. 733 (1946).
136. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1955, p. 26, col. 5, reports that Georgia has set up a device
whereby the superintendent of a county school system has authority to assign pupils to the
schools they will attend. Students who object to this decision must appeal first to the super-
intendent, then to the local board of education, then to the state superintendent and then
to the state board of education.
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a nature as to afford no real probability of relief.137 This exception to the rule
should be applicable in the school discrimination situation whenever it appears
that the school administration itself is intent on denying plaintiffs their rights. 38
Another obstacle may exist in the rule of Snowden v. Hughes 139 that sec-
tions 1983 and 1985(3) do not give a plaintiff the right to sue for a denial of
equal protection unless he can demonstrate that he is a victim of a purposeful
discrimination.140 A requirement that defendants have the purpose to deny a
citizen the equal protection of the laws is found in the wording of section
1985 (3), but no similar phrase appears in section 1983.14 , Nevertheless, Snow-
den and other decisions appear to have carried the requirement over into sec-
tion 1983 where it has become a requirement of willfulness. 142 It might be
argued that whenever the deprivation to be remedied under 1983 is a denial
of equal protection, rather than of due process, the imposition of the Snowden
requirement is appropriate. But while the Supreme Court has construed the
criminal sections of the CRA to require willfulness, 43 there appears to be no
reason why a similar requirement should be applied to section 1983, which
creates a civil liability sounding in tort.144 Even if willfulness is required under
137. "To remit each of these children and the thousands of others similarly situated
to thousands of administrative hearings before this board to seek the relief to which the
Supreme Court has said they are entitled would be a vain and useless gesture unworthy
of a court of equity." Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 24 U.S.L. WEEK 2388 (E.D.
La. Feb. 15, 1956). Cf. Bruce v. Stilwell, 206 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Carter v,
School Bd., 182 F.2d 531, 536 (4th Cir. 1950). See DAVIs, AM INISTRATIVE LAW § 189
(1951).
138. But cf. Mills v. Woods, 190 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Cook v. Davis, 178 F.2d
595 (5th Cir. 1949). These were § 1983 suits in which injunctive relief against school
discrimination was denied because plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies
as required by state law. However, there was no allegation in either case that the adminis-
trative remedy was ineffectual.
139. 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
140. "The unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute fair on its face,
resulting in its unequal application to those entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of
equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or pur-
poseful discrimination." Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). In Snowden plaintiff
sued for damages under §§ 1983 and 1985(3). The Court upheld the lower court's dis-
missal of the complaint apparently because the failure to allege purposeful discrimination
was a failure to allege a denial of equal protection. The court did not specifically indicate
if it was only speaking of a requirement for suit under § 1985(3).
141. Compare § 1983, quoted in note 111 supra, with § 1985(3), quoted in note 121
supra.
142. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1., 8 (1944) ; Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control
Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Burt v. City of New York, 156 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.
1946) ; Morgan v. Null, 117 F. Supp. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
Some courts also read a requirement of willfulness into the civil provisions of the Civil
Rights Acts by assuming that the same requirement of the criminal provisions is control-
ling. See Boyer v. Garrett, 88 F. Supp. 353, 357 (D. Md. 1949), aff'd without consideration
of this point, 183 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 912 (1950). But see note 144
infra and accompanying text.
143. See note 104 supra.
144. See Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 776 (1947). See also Note, 7 BAYLOR L. REv. 224, 230-32 (1955).
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section 1983, this heed not inhibit and indeed recently has not inhibited the
application of the statute. 14  The opinion in Snowden stated that although a
discriminatory purpose was not to be presumed, such purpose could be deemed
apparent from the face of the conduct itself or could be proved by extrinsic
evidence.' 46 Certainly, an allegation of purposeful discrimination cannot be said
to be unsubstantiated if the discrimination proved is at all systematic. On its
face, systematic discrimination should evince purposeful action.
The most serious substantive obstacle to the imposition of tort liability upon
state officials lies in the doctrine of official immunity.147 The history and lan-
guage of the Civil Rights Acts indicate that most, if not all, official immunities
were meant to be rendered inoperative if state officials interfered with the
Negro's Fourteenth Amendment rights.148 Nevertheless, a number of courts
have recently indicated that the immunity doctrine was largely unaffected by
the CRA. 14 9 Absolute immunity under the CRA has been established for legis-
lators and judges.'x 0 Members of school boards and other administrative officials
generally enjoy only a qualified common law immunity which is limited to
actions taken in good faith.' 1' Under the CRA these officials are accorded at
least no greater immunity,0 2 and it has been suggested that even good faith
may not always be a defense.'1 3 Whether or not common law immunity still
145. E.g., Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955)
(abstracted at note 114 supra) ; McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955) ; Valle
v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d
774 (9th Cir. 1947).
146. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944).
147. See Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955) (justice of the peace held to be
immune from § 1983 damage suit) ; Note, The Doctrine of Official Immunity Under the
Civil Rights Acts, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1229 (1955) ; Note, 46 COLUm. L. Rrv. 614 (1946).
148. See Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Morgan v. Null,
117 F. Supp. 11, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Notes, 68 -ARv. L. REv. 1229 (1955), 46 COLUm.
L. REv. 614,618 (1946).
149. See, e.g., Tate v. Arnold, 223 F.2d 782 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Francis v. Lyman, 216
F.2d 583, 588 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Dunn v. Estes, 117 F. Supp. 146 (D. Mass. 1953).
150. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislator) ; Francis v. Crafts, 203
F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1953) (judge) ; Tate v. Arnold, supra note 149 (justice of the peace).
151. E.g., Speyer v. School Dist. No. 1, 82 Colo. 534, 261 Pac. 859 (1927) (officers of
school district) ; see Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 706-07 (1st Cir. 1953) (con-
curring opinion) ; PROSSER, ToaRs 781 (2d ed. 1955) ; James, Tort Liability of Govern-
mental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm. L. Rav. 610, 635-48 (1955) ; Jennings, Tort
Liability of Administrative Offlcers, 21 MImNN. L. REv. 263, 276-97 (1937).
If school boards are considered sub-legislative bodies, their members might be absolutely
immune, see PRossER, TORTS 781 (2d ed. 1955), but this result is not certain, see Cobb v.
City of Malden, supra.
152. See Cobb v. City of M[alden, supra note 151, at 707: "The privilege by way of
defense to the prima facie federal tort defined in [§ 1983] . -. . should certainly be no
broader than the privilege that would be accorded under the common law." See also Note,
68 HAIV. L. REV. 1229, 1235 (1955).
153. "Where [§ 1983] ... has been invoked in situations which no doubt were a major
concern of the Reconstruction Congress ... the Supreme Court has not been loath to im-
pose tort liability upon such state officials .... There it is no defense to the state officials
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applies to administrative officials may be of little importance when the damage
suits against them are grounded on a denial of equal protection. Willfulness,
as evidenced by systematic discrimination, will often be present in these suits,
and willfulness is inconsistent with good faith.
The Civil Rights Acts will be useful in combatting indirect interference pro-
vided the circumvention device can be deemed state action. All of the CRA
provisions except section 241 can usually be used only against persons acting
under color of state law or, in other words, against state action.
15 4 Most com-
mentators agree that the establishment of private schools to replace the public
schools, with provision for direct or indirect subsidization or control, will bring
segregation by the new private schools within the present concept of state action
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 5 And a recent white primary case indi-
cates that this segregation will constitute state action even if the state relin-
quishes all control and withdraws financial support.' 56
CoNqcLUSION
No radical departure from existing law is necessary to utilize the contempt
power and the Civil Rights Acts to enforce desegregation. The sanctions are
available. What must be developed is a wise and farsighted plan for the care-
ful use of these legal weapons. Vital to the success of any plan will be a federal
agency capable of co-ordinating the use of the available enforcement devices.
Before using its own criminal weapons, the agency should by negotiation at-
that they may have acted, not maliciously, but in the good-faith belief that thcy were per-
forming their official duty under what they thought was valid state legislation." Francis
v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583, 588 (1st Cir. 1954). It is not clear on what basis the Supreme
Court decisions referred to, Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) and Lane v. Wilson,
307 U.S. 268 (1939), held that liability could be imposed on the election officials who were
the defendants. It may have been, as the First Circuit suggests, because racial discrimina-
tion was involved, or because the defendants acted under a statute which ultimately was
declared unconstitutional. For a discussion of the latter reason, see Field, The Effect of
an Unconstitutional Statute in the Law of Public Officers: Liability of Officers for Action
or Nonaction, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 155 (1928) ; Rapacz, Protection of Officers Who Act
Under Unconstitutional Statutes, 11 MINN. L. RE. 585 (1927).
154. 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952) refers to action under color of state
law. See -note 111 supra. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), has construed 12
STAT. 284 (1861), 17 STAT. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1952), to punish only con-
spirators who act under color of law. 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1952) also refers to action under
color of law, see note 96 supra, and this section has been held to reach acts done under
color of federal as well as state law, Gowdy v. United States, 207 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1953).
155. See, e.g., Leflar & Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARv. L.
REv. 377, 407 (1954) ; Nicholson, The Legal Standing of the South's School Resistance
Proposals, 7 S.C.L.Q. 1, 62 (1954) : "The South's attempts to circumvent the school de-
cision seem doomed to legal failure. The Court has ample theories to utilize in avoiding
all circumvention proposals-ranging from the relatively simple state instrumentality con-
cept to the all permeating doctrine of Shelley v. Kraenter"; Sutherland, Segregation by
Race in the Public Schools-Retrospect and Prospect, 20 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 169, 183
(1955).
156. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948).
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tempt to convince resistant communities to desegregate in accord with district
court mandates. If the use of sanctions becomes necessary, an over-all plan of
enforcement should be formulated by the agency. Duplication of suits should
be avoided. And the agency may prefer sporadic enforcement rather than the
unleashing of the full force of the contempt power and the Civil Rights Acts.
An agency capable of co-ordinating enforcement presently exists within the
Department of Justice. The Civil Rights Section of the Department now
handles most of the actions brought under sections 241 and 242, and it has
acquired considerable experience in the use of negotiation to avoid the need for
suits to restrain and redress deprivations of civil liberties.157 The Section's
staff should be expanded to enable it to prosecute 241, 242 and criminal con-
tempt actions necessary to enforce desegregation. The Section would also be
able to co-ordinate the use of private remedies by informal advice and aid to
individuals and private civil liberties groups in connection with civil contempt
proceedings and section 1983 and 1985(3) actions. The Justice Department's
amicus curiae brief in the Brown case indicates its strong desire to end segre-
gation in the public schools.'r s It can make this desire a reality by using its
own Civil Rights Section to supplement and co-ordinate the forces already
mobilized to implement desegregation.
157. Putzel, Federal Civil Rights Enforcement: A Current Appraisal, 99 U. PA. L.
REv. 439, 445 (1951) ; CARR, FEDFRAL PRomicriox OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
158. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 485 (1954).
